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Abstract
The purpose of  this article is to familiarize readers with a philosophical essay by J.M.E. 
McTaggart and then to employ it as a basis of  literary analysis. The early-20th century ar-
guments on the unreality of  time by metaphysician J.M.E. McTaggart’s are applied to the 
temporal experience of  madmen in 19th-20th century British and American prose pieces. 
It is the intention of  this study to decipher the thoughts of  certain characters in works by 
Bernard Malamud, Virginia Woolf  and Edgar Allan Poe, in the hope that we can uncover 
logic, truth-value, or a channel of  communication with them. The purpose is not to prove 
that they did not suffer from psychological illnesses, rather it is to challenge the idea that 
the inability to exist in linear, everyday time is a symptom of  madness. By familiarizing 
the reader with McTaggart’s assertion that time is unreal, and approximating it to the 
quantum-physical theories of  Stephen Hawking, I attempt to outline how McTaggart’s 
ideas concerning time align with those prevalent today. By analyzing how the characters in 
certain prose pieces think about time or live in time, I contend that their experiences offer 
an opportunity for us to learn and understand. 
Key words: time, unreality of  time, madness in fiction, J.M.E. McTaggart
Introduction
For millennia, the concept of  madness has fascinated scholars and authors alike. We can-
not help but be intrigued and oftentimes terrified by individuals who “act deviant from 
the societal canon”, lacking a unified vision on reality different from the way “normal” 
(neurotypical) minds do. The purpose of  this paper is not to attempt to change the physi-
ological and psychological definitions of  madness and mental illnesses. It is without ques-
tion that mental illnesses signal a fragmented state of  mind that requires careful assisting, 
monitoring and examining, whether it is just with talk therapy, a combination of  medi-
cations, or institutionalization. However, what this article does question, is the refusal to 
accept the logic of  certain mentally ill individuals in certain works of  fiction, based on the 
idea that their thoughts appear incoherent or strange viewed from one specific ontological 
point of  view: namely that linear time exists, and that it is a valid system of  inertia around 
which to arrange the elements of  reality. 
J.M.E. McTaggart was a British philosopher in the Idealist tradition. According to J. 
A. Bernstein, McTaggart’s 1908 essay “The Unreality of  Time”, raised more than a few 
eyebrows upon its publication, primarily due its central argument: time is unreal. Bernstein 
mentions that McTaggart’s idea was not well received at first “not least because it ques-
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tioned three thousand years of  spatial-temporal metaphysics”.1 It is interesting to note 
that McTaggart himself  did not view his essay as paradigm-changing, as he himself  high-
lighted at the start of  “The Unreality of  Time” stating that he was not the only philoso-
pher of  his own time (Sic!) to ponder upon the reality of  time.2 Undoubtedly McTaggart 
was correct, however, what makes his essay particularly intriguing is his reasoning. He 
notes that: “I believe that time is unreal. But I do so for reasons which are not, I think, 
employed by any of  the philosophers whom I have mentioned.”3 Of  course, from a 
contemporary standpoint this is likely no longer the case. Edward Freeman argues that 
McTaggart’s arguments may sound somewhat obsolete to the modern reader,4 however, 
I am still particularly drawn to using them to analyze the temporal experience of  “mad-
men” in fiction. Why McTaggart? Why not Bergson, Husserl, or Heidegger? To me, the 
answer lies in the organic relationship between the character of  the author, his subject 
matter and style with regard to my thesis. He was undoubtedly a significant philosopher 
and well-known in academic circles, but I feel his work is somewhat overlooked in light 
of  the significance of  his oeuvre. 
Coming from a fiction writing background, my interest in studying “The Unreali-
ty of  Time” also stems from a semi-conscious professional interest in the character of  
J.M.E. McTaggart. On reading “The Unreality of  Time”, it appeared to me that he had a 
very profound, yet often vaguely communicated drive to understand the metaphysics of  
our existence, but that this profound, quasi-logical drive was somehow fuelled by a deeply 
emotional, personal human experience that is the peculiarity of  non-neurotypical minds. 
This is not to assert that McTaggart had mental problems, but that his specific approach 
to the temporal feels particularly pertinent whilst the goal is to present an empathic bridge 
of  understanding between our neurotypical perception of  time, and the perception of  
those we deem non-neurotypical. It has been highlighted that McTaggart displayed ec-
1 J.A. Bernstein, “‘No Audible Tick’: Conrad, McTaggart, and the Revolt against Time,” The Conradian 
37, no. 1 (2012): 32. www.jstor.org/stable/23264493
2 “In philosophy, again,time is treated as unreal by Spinoza, by Kant, by Hegel, and by Schopenhauer. 
In the philosophy of the present day the two most important, movements (excluding those which are 
as yet merely critical) are those which look to Hegel and to Mr. Bradley. And both of these schools 
deny the reality of time”. J. M. E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”. Mind: A Quarterly Review of 
Psycholog y and Philosophy 17, (1908): 456-473. http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html 
3 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 456-473.
4 “Nowadays, few philosophers who take up the problem of time endorse this sweeping metaphysical 
thesis. Most see fluid time as entirely illusory. The rest are split between those who believe to the 
contrary and those who hold both fluid time and static time to be equally real.” Edward Freeman, 
“On McTaggart’s Theory of Time,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2010): 389. www.jstor.org/
stable/25762149 
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centric behavior. As noted in the Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy: “He was on most 
accounts an unusual fellow, with a big head and a crab-like walk (Rochelle 1991, 97). Peter 
Geach (1971, 10) reports that, ‘To the end of  his days he walked down corridors with a 
curious shuffle, back to the wall, as if  expecting a sudden kick from behind.’ (…) McTag-
gart saluted cats whenever he met them (Dickinson 1931, 68; Rochelle 1991, 97). (…) His 
preferred method of  transportation was a tricycle.”5 McTaggart believed that mysticism 
was an essential approach to experience and the transcribing of  reality.6 He frequent-
ly described a hypersensitive experience called “the Saul feeling”7 based on Browning’s 
poem, Saul, which begins: “I know not too well how I found my way home in the dark”. 
His musings on the nature of  existence lead him into a mystical universe—he believed in 
“the harmony of  immortal spirits”8 and that the fundamental glue that holds the Universe 
together is Love.9 
Though he certainly wasn’t the only unusual philosopher in history, applying his 
ideas to the thoughts of  non-neurotypical fictional characters instantly unraveled a partic-
ularly interesting, even emotional connection to these characters. I would like to take the 
reader on a journey through McTaggart, and hopefully, as sentimental as it sounds, convey 
the same empathic connection to the strange and unusual I have been lucky enough to 
experience through him. 
Time, just like madness, has fascinated the minds of  scholars and authors alike, for 
thousands of  years. Even our everyday, individual perception of  time is constantly chang-
ing, let alone the scientific proposals which familiarize us with its nature. Not even the 
greatest minds of  history can account for certain properties of  it (even Stephen Hawk-
ing struggled to provide a way to account for the direction of  time for example10). The 
purpose of  this article is not to state something fundamentally new about the nature of  
time. However, it is proposed to draw several links between e.g. arguments of  McTaggart 
and the thoughts of  Stephen Hawking, in an attempt to explain what, with our present 
understanding, can be accounted for what McTaggart calls “time” as a whole in his essay. 
5 “Biographical Sketch of McTaggart” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta 
(1995), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/mctaggart/ 
6 “Theology never holds itself apart from mysticism for any long period, and almost all mysticism de-
nies the reality of time.” J.M.E. McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 456-473.
7 G. Lowes Dickinson, J. McT. E. McTaggart (Oxford University Press, 1931), 94.
8 Dickinson, J. McT. E. McTaggart, 96.
9 Dickinson, J. McT. E. McTaggart, 96
10 “To summarize, the laws of science do not distinguish between the forward and backward direction 
of time.” Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time (London: Bantam Books, Penguin Random House 
UK, 2016), 172.
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Looking at “The Unreality of  Time” through the lens of  Hawking, as opposed to other 
20th century philosophers who also dealt with the non-linearity of  time, lends itself  to 
my thesis. As this will be elaborated on later, my understanding is that what McTaggart 
calls “time” is in essence what we might associate with our linear, everyday perception of  
time, which according to Hawking’s scientific proposal, is the so-called “psychological arrow 
of  time”. It should come as no surprise that literary characters coping with some sort of  
psychological deficit, find it challenging to arrange their existence around some mysteri-
ous entity labelled as the “psychological arrow of  time”, the concept, perceptions and rules of  
time that sane, neurotypical minds prescribe to. 
After an introduction to McTaggart’s essay, and his arguments, I will conduct an 
analysis of  three characters from three pieces of  prose: Isaac from Bernard Malamud’s 
short story “Idiots First”, Septimus Warren Smith from Virginia Woolf ’s Mrs. Dalloway 
and Roderick Usher from Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Fall of  the House of  Usher”. The 
method will involve exploring, through a McTaggartian lens, their inner mental logic and/
or the non-typical behavior they display in their respective texts; that is, the behavior and 
thought that result in them being perceived as “mad” in their environments. I will attempt 
to show how, with a McTaggartian reading (i.e. our linear perception of  time is not neces-
sarily true to reality, a.k.a. the psychological arrow of  time is something which is only fully 
adaptable by neurotypical minds), their thoughts and actions can be decoded in a different 
way. This is not an attempt to reject medicine or psychology and conclude that these three 
characters are indeed “normal” –, the objective is to present a bridge of  understanding, an 
unbiased, non-judgemental method through which to connect with these characters in a 
more profound manner. Such a reading can also assist in us connecting with the respective 
authors, also: it should be noted that two out of  the three authors (Woolf  and Poe) coped 
with similar conditions to their fictive characters. Not only this, but McTaggart himself  
was somewhat non-neurotypical, thus, this paper might also somehow help to unpick the 
relationship of  the authors to their texts. 
I. The Unreality of  Time… and what remains of  it now
As per the Stanford Encyclopaedia of  Philosophy, McTaggart was “one of  the most 
important systematic metaphysicians of  the early 20th century. His greatest work is The 
Nature of  Existence (...). In addition, he authored many important articles on metaphysics, 
including his famous The Unreality of  Time in 1908 (…).”11 McTaggart was “also a dedicat-
ed interpreter and champion of  Hegel, (...)” and his most important recurring conclusions 
11 Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
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in relation to the Hegelian dialectic and cosmology were “that time is unreal, that exis-
tence exhausts reality, that modal notions cannot be applied to reality as a whole, and that 
absolute reality contains imperfections”.12
One of  the most important and axiomatic notions that needs to be re-iterated be-
fore engaging with McTaggart’s essay is that even though he argues for the non-existence 
of  time, he argues so at a point in history when the notions and approaches towards 
the temporal were based on a certain set of  philosophical, empirical and scientific ideas. 
Therefore, even though McTaggart denounces the existence of  time, he does so on the 
basis of  what that term meant during or before that period: the pre-Einsteinian absolute 
time. His observations are, if  not exclusively, primarily on a linear, horizontal scope of  
events. More precisely, time, which is technically based on and measured by an exterior 
system that reduces it to units that can be directly positioned onto a horizontal line of  
events. This line is based on either the moments’ position in history, that is past, present, 
or future (this notion he calls the “A Series”) or the more abstract temporally fixed quality 
of  each moment in correlation with each other as to being either earlier or later than one 
another (this he calls the “B Series”) or a notion on the position of  events having a fixed 
atemporal order of  M, N, O P – a sequential order only, and not a direction (“C Series”).13 
As will be clarified later, there are several internal paradoxes between these three “Series”. 
These paradoxes are a vital element of  McTaggart’s final conclusion, and have been also 
generating long-standing debates between those generally inclined to accept the A Series 
to be true and those who do so with the B Series. The so-called B-Theorists are accepting of  
the theory of  relativity based on the B Series, ergo it can be argued that traces of  Einstein-
ian time are already evident in McTaggart’s ideas.  
The A Series describes events happening in a moment that is past, present, or future. 
Clearly, these are not fixed positions. An event, which is occurring at one moment was 
once the future and will be the past later. As opposed to this, the B Series is a fixed, per-
manent notion. An event, which precedes another, will always have this fixed position of  
being earlier as opposed to being later than another, a moment which occurs after it. We 
were always born after our mothers, and they after theirs. According to McTaggart, events 
12 Zalta, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/ 
13 “The paradox that he introduced has become seminal in contemporary philosophy, engendering 
what are essentially two warring camps of theorists: the “presentists” and the “eternalists;” or, those 
who see time as occurring only in the present (the A-Series), and those who see it as occurring at 
all points but dependent upon the frame of reference (the B-Series). To some extent, this debate 
predates McTaggart, owing much to the arguments between Leibniz and Newton over what time is, 
and, specifically, whether it is “real” or not— meaning whether it can be said to exist independent of 
human conception, a question that dates back to antiquity.” Bernstein, “No Audible Tick,” 33. 
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are the “contents of  a position in time” and moments a “position in time”.14 McTaggart 
argues that since the B Series is a permanent notion, it should be more accurate than the 
relative A Series when it comes to describing time. However, the A Series appears to cap-
ture the essence of  time, but it is contradictory, and less accurate than the B Series, there-
fore, existence is most likely not temporal. McTaggart begins to argue for the non-exis-
tence of  time since the notion, which would describe it in a more perceptually accurate 
way is contradictory and less accurate than a permanent, therefore objective notion. An 
interesting side-note from Richard M. Gale should be inserted here, an assertion that I 
am inclined to agree with. Gale, in contrast to the popular conviction that McTaggart’s 
article is essentially metaphysical in outlook (Freeman15, Bernstein16) proposes a different 
route to deciphering his thoughts, claiming that in fact, McTaggart’s essay takes a phe-
nomenological approach, “being based on the way in which temporal positions appear to 
us, but everything he says could be recast, and for purposes of  clarity needs to be recast, 
in a linguistic idiom which describes the different ways in which we talk about temporal 
positions.”17 He illustrates his point by rephrasing an argument of  McTaggart’s, underlin-
ing that McTaggart’s issue with the reality of  time stems from intuitively tapping into a 
discrepancy between how we talk about time and time itself.18 
I would argue that citing a phenomenological approach is vital at this point, in order 
to ease the reader into applying a specific lens of  focus whilst studying McTaggart. One 
that will draw us closer to the most important point yet to be made: namely, that all his 
ideas are based on (or rather, attempt to answer) the question as to whether the concept of  
linear time actually has a valid system of  reference in reality or not. This will also bring us closer 
14 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 456-473.
15 “Nowadays, few philosophers who take up the problem of time endorse this sweeping metaphysical 
thesis.” Freeman, “On McTaggart’s Theory of Time,” 389. 
16 “McTaggart’s question – how we perceive time – is essentially metaphysical; (…)” Bernstein, “No 
Audible Tick,” 34. 
17 Richard M. Gale, “McTaggart’s Analysis of Time,” American Philosophical Quarterly 3, no. 2 (1966): 146. 
www.jstor.org/stable/20009201 
18 “He begins by saying: ‘Positions in time, as time appears to us prima facie, are distinguished in two 
ways. Each position is Earlier than some and Later than some of the other positions. … In the sec-
ond place, each position is either Past, Present, or Future. The distinctions of the former class are 
permanent, while those of the latter are not.’ This can be rephrased linguistically as: There are two 
fundamentally different ways in which we make temporal determinations. First, we can say that one 
event is earlier (later) than some other event; and, second, we can say that some event is now past 
(present, future). The sentences employed in making claims of the first sort make statements having 
the same truth-value every time they are uttered, while the sentences employed in the second sort 
of temporal determination may make statements having different truth-values if uttered at different 
times.” Gale, “McTaggart’s Analysis of Time,” 146. 
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to the conclusion of  how to relate McTaggart’s terminology of  “time” to the current 
scientific approach.
As already mentioned, McTaggart describes time with a relative and a fixed notion. 
He claims that the fixed notion, technically, should be more accurate in grasping the 
nature of  time – and the pre-requisites it has to apply upon itself  to have a valid system 
of  reference in reality, however, that is not the case. Inaccuracy is not the only issue he 
raises with the A Series. He elaborates on his proposal by asking the question whether time 
actually forms an A Series as well as a B Series, or whether the distinctions of  past, present, 
future, however vital and crucial they seem, are merely tricks of  the mind. Of  course, time 
is experienced as a mixture of  both, but maybe our perception is not valid: “It may be the 
case that the distinction introduced among positions in time by the A series – the distinc-
tion of  past, present and future – is simply a constant illusion of  our minds, and that the 
real nature of  time only contains the distinction of  the B series – the distinction of  earlier 
and later. In that case we could not perceive time as it really is, but we might be able to think 
of  it as it really is.”19 
Realizing the discrepancy between how we are able to perceive time versus how we 
are able to think about it is a very important point. This is where it becomes clear that 
McTaggart makes a distinction between time as an exterior, objective concept (our per-
ception, which is false), and the interior realisation of  this discrepancy. The supposition 
that time is something we perceive within an objective framework entails the notion that 
it is completely internal, that everything is essentially created by our minds. Sane minds 
create notions, consciously (we create names for months, years, days, we divide time into 
units) or unconsciously (perceiving the temporal as events in the past, present or future). 
Yet these notions are fragile and can be altered when one’s state of  mind changes. Even 
McTaggart argues that one of  the abilities, which makes us exist in time, is the ability to 
remember things: with this, he fundamentally reflects on the fact that sane, non-trauma-
tised, conscious minds are more able to fully experience time as this objective, external 
notion. It is reasonable to derive the conclusion that in this case, biased minds (mentally 
ill, dying, dreaming, hypersensitive) are unable to exist in time, as far as time is this exter-
nal, perception-based, and insufficient set of  rules. 
This is the point at which in my opinion, Stephen Hawking’s work can expand on 
what McTaggart calls “time”: Hawking’s so-called “psychological arrow of  time”. I would 
argue that McTaggart’s concept of  time connects somewhat with Hawking’s concept. 
Hawking argues that time (linear time) has an “arrow”, emphasizing its direction, mov-
ing as it does from the past to the future, from birth to death. The reason why time’s 
19 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time,” 456-473. 
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arrow points in the direction it does is potentially due to three factors, or three supposed 
types of  arrow: the psychological arrow (the direction in which we actually perceive it to 
pass: we remember the past and anticipate the future, but not the other way round), the 
thermodynamical arrow (the direction in which entropy or disorder increases) and the 
cosmological arrow (the direction of  time in which the universe is expanding and not 
contracting).20 
Without engaging too deeply with quantum-physics, it is sufficient to argue that 
Hawking’s idea appears to account for McTaggart’s concept of  time; that is, a mere per-
ception. A complex perceptive entity whose system of  reference in reality is constructed 
and maintained by our minds, based on factors existing independently from us (the ther-
modynamical and cosmological arrow), but reduced into a system of  internal and external 
(everyday) inertia, which is able to cope with it and give it a shape and a form according to 
our mental capabilities. But is it actually a reflection of  “reality”? That, of  course depends 
on what we call “real”, but according to Hawking, that is not even the point: he claims that 
every theory necessarily only exists within our minds, so as opposed to asking what is real 
and what is not, it is better to ask which is a more useful description.21 
At some point Hawking began to talk of  a concept called “imaginary time”, which 
he used to  account for certain quantum-physical explanations to the nature of  our uni-
verse (essentially, a universe which is like a perpetuum mobile forever existing without a 
beginning or end, as opposed to one that was “born” and will “die”).22 His arguments for 
the necessity of  such a concept (imaginary time) essentially validate McTaggart’s claims, 
or at the very least give a nod of  approval to his musings on the absolute/sole “true to 
reality value” of  “real time”.
Through Hawking’s lens it can be concluded that McTaggart’s “time” is in essence 
a canonised set of  rules derived from an internal, psychological perception of  time by sane, neuro-typical 
minds. Can we fault non-neurotypical minds, unable to align themselves perfectly within 
this externally canonized epistemological lie, even if  our lives are ordered around these 
20 See Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 164.
21 “But (...) scientific theory is just a mathematical model we make to describe our observations: it exists 
only in our minds. So it is meaningless to ask: which is real, ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’ time? It is simply a 
matter of which is the more useful description.” Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 159.
22 “This might suggest that the so-called imaginary time is really the real time, and that what we call 
time is just a fragment of our imaginations. In real time, the universe has a beginning and an end at 
singularities that form a boundary to space-time and at which the laws of science break down. But in 
imaginary time, there are no singularities or boundaries. So maybe what we call imaginary time is re-
ally more basic, and what we call real is just an idea that we invent to keep us describe what we think 
the universe is like.” Hawking, A Brief History of Time, 158-159.
15MadMen In and Out Of tIMe a MctaggartIan readIng Of Madness In fIctIOn
Pro&Contra 1 (2019) 5–30.
external rules and prerequisites (like how we measure time in hours, or assign ourselves 
a birthdate)?
There is another part of  McTaggart’s essay which still needs to be expounded upon: 
the so-called C Series. After failing to demonstrate the reality of  time with the A and B 
Series, whilst embarking on a quest to discover a different equation that can explain time, 
McTaggart introduces the C Series, an atemporal fixed order of  plain, timeless events 
having a permanent order of  M, N, O, P in relation to each other. They form a B Series 
(temporal relations existing earlier or later) with the help of  change. This does not mean, 
however, that he has established the existence of  time as there is a discrepancy in that 
change would come from a presumed A Series which he has already argued to be a plain per-
ceptive illusion. The meaning of  the concepts of  past, present and future can be illustrated 
through examples, but this does not define what is meant by them, what they really are.23 
It is but an abstraction. Examining McTaggart’s essay as a whole, returns us to the notion 
that what he calls time is a construction of  the mind, because no equation can properly de-
scribe it without mentally/internally/subjectively assuming its existence.
It is important here to take a moment to note that the unreality of  time to various 
degrees is one of  the greatest axiomatic notions of  20th century philosophy. However, 
McTaggart’s reasoning has many unique focal points, including when, at the very end of  
his essay, he makes a small, almost insignificant-seeming remark about the fact that even 
though he has refuted time, the temporal, the A and B Series, etc., he cannot do so just yet 
with the C Series. As discussed above, the C Series is in essence an atemporal position of  
things yet to become what he calls events since they don’t have a temporal quality which are in a fixed 
order of  M, N, O, P. When he described this Series, he used the example of  numbers, and 
how 17, 18, 19 and 20 are always in that given order. It could be experienced in a reverse 
direction, as 20, 19, 18, 17 and still make sense, but it contradicts with our basic percep-
tion of  the direction of  change (unless it is for some dramatic/momentary function like a 
countdown). But it is not possible to have an order of  e.g. 17, 19, 21, 18. At the very end 
of  his essay, McTaggart states: 
23 Rightfully so because even Hawking argues that as far as science is concerned, there is essentially 
no difference between past and future: “Where does this difference between the past and the future 
come from? Why do we remember the past but not the future? The laws of science do not distin-
guish between the past and the future. More precisely, as explained earlier, the laws of science are 
unchanged under the combination of operation (or symmetries) known as C, P and T.” Hawking, A 
Brief History of Time, 164.
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But the question whether such an objective C series does exist, must remain for future dis-
cussions. And many other questions press upon us which inevitably arise if  the reality of  
time is denied. If  there is such a C series, are positions in it simply ultimate facts, or are they 
determined by the varying amounts, in the objects which hold those positions, of  some qual-
ity which is common to all of  them? And, if  so, what is that quality, and is it a greater amount 
of  it which determines things to appear as later, and a lesser amount which determines them 
to appear as earlier, or is the reverse true? On the solution of  these questions it may be that 
our hopes and tears for the universe depend for their confirmation or rejection.24
How can we interpret these mysterious elements, which have an amount but not a 
temporality, varying amounts in the objects, which hold certain positions, and an objec-
tive, undeniable fact value under any circumstance? It might not be completely accurate, 
but there is a possibility to interpret them simply as numbers. With this brief  remark, 
McTaggart could have been postulating a universe based on numbers as opposed to a 
temporal quality. This universe is, in fact, a computer program. In 1999, two film direc-
tors, the Wachowskis directed a film called The Matrix, which confronted viewers with the 
possibility that life is no more than a computer simulation. How is it that a philosopher 
in 1908, without any possible understanding or knowledge of  the future appearance of  
computers and computer programs comes to the very same unconscious conclusion? 
And why, in this particular segment of  his essay, pondering upon the puzzling nature of  
the C Series, did he abandon his normal prose style replacing it with a poetic voice? He 
writes of  “hopes and tears for the universe” which is pure poetry – it entails a very primal, 
a very desperate, fearful and profound understanding of  the importance of  the subject 
without being able to express it in a fully rational way. Though it is not the task of  this 
article to explore this issue, it is worth mentioning, correlating as it does with the idea that 
he had a certain kind of  semi-conscious sensitivity about the understanding of  greater 
powers at work, as did the sensitive narrators/protagonists explored below. 
II. Madness and what is meant by it
Madness is a somewhat derogatory term which describes minds who process reality in 
an abnormal fashion, and this neuro-fault can result in the afflicted harming of  others 
or themselves. More acceptable terminology for describing such a condition includes: a 
changed mental condition, a psychological condition or a mental illness; however, for the 
purposes of  this essay “madness” is understood as a poetic term which is describing a 
24 McTaggart, “The Unreality of Time”, 456-473.
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set of  fictional characters, whose internal logic rearranges the elements of  the external 
universe in an order unrecognizable to the majority. It is not a condition based on an 
altered physiological state (dreaming, stupor), but a lifelong (Isaac in “Idiots First”) or an 
acquired (Septimus Warren Smith in Mrs. Dalloway, Roderick Usher in “The Fall of  the 
House of  Usher”) condition of  the conscious mind which fundamentally shifts the indi-
vidual’s perceptive conclusions into an internalised, rearranged set of  “parallel universes”. 
It is a parallel universe because the rules and logic, which define their existence, are vastly 
different than those of  the sane mind. They live within this rearranged interior universe, 
with little regard to the exterior. That is why it is so hard to understand them and why 
some claim that their reflections and thoughts are chaotic and lack consistency. However, 
by viewing their thoughts, musings and words through a different lens, an intriguing and 
special logic can be seen to be at work. This alternative reading of  their interior logic is 
possible by analyzing it through McTaggart’s notions on time. 
The Hungarian term for a senseless person is “idétlen” which stems from the word 
“időtlen”, meaning timeless, unable to exist in time: derived from the original root of  the 
word “idő”, “idé”, it means “before time”, “prematurely born baby”. These premature-
ly born babies were usually mentally challenged, hence the original connotation of  the 
word.25 But the underlying, fundamental argument about these entities is their timeless-
ness, as for example in Hungarian Folklore this term is employed to describe souls of  
dead babies who die prematurely, with their spirit returning to haunt the living26—they 
become timeless creatures, stuck souls, not functioning under the rules of  the sane minds’ 
exterior reality. It is fascinating how even such a simple construction of  language associ-
ates being mentally challenged with a fault, a malfunction existing in time. In the second 
part of  this study, we turn to the minds of  the madmen, and examine how their minds 
rearrange the linear sets of  rules McTaggart uses to describe time, and to what extent 
their universes are temporal at all. 
25 “Idétlen. Az idő régebbi idé- tövének fosztóképzős származéka, s eredetileg idő előttit, koraszülöttet 
jelentett. Az ilyenek, főleg régebben, többnyire elmaradtak a szellemi fejlődésben, innen a szó ma 
eleven jelentése.” Mag yar Etimológiai Kéziszótár. Arcanum Digitális Tudománytár. https://www.arca-
num.hu/hu/online-kiadvanyok/Lexikonok-magyar-etimologiai-szotar-F14D3/
26 Beke Ödön, “Idétlen” in “Magyarázatok”. Mag yar Nyelvőr, A Mag yar Nyelvtudományi Társaság Folyóirata 
76, no. 1 (1952): 56.
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III. Madness in fiction 
Before analyzing the literary texts, it is important to expand on the reasons for studying 
the temporal experience of  mentally ill individuals in fiction. 
First, there is the case of  temporal experience in fiction. What temporal experience 
can be talked about given the fact that the construction of  the fictional text itself  is al-
ready a structural alternation of  reality, and the novel or short story itself  always entails 
a “fictive experience of  time”?27 As Paul Ricoeur remarks in his 2nd volume of  Time and 
Narrative, “the experience of  time at issue here is a fictive experience that has an imaginary 
world for its horizon, one that remains the world of  the text”.28 
While not wishing to disagree with Ricoeur, I argue that fictional prose is a possible 
genre to consider in attempting to understand character-driven temporal experience that 
can have a system of  reference in and of  extratextual reality, and stretches beyond the 
fictive experience of  time. This analysis attempts to examine how time, as an exterior 
concept, is challenged by characters who themselves experience a rift between “reality” 
and “fantasy” (or more like delusion). These characters do so by essentially living in a 
linear reality of  the prose, which is similar to temporal reality or at least functions within a 
system of  logic which is familiar to us (a.k.a. a prosaic storyline which passes from A to 
B) yet the characters are able to drift away from time, which passes in a linear way. Prose 
is significant in so far as it allows for a description of  reality as a human experience, even 
if  it entails structural alternations due to the medium of  fiction itself. The three texts se-
lected are “tales about time”.29 And while not wishing to disagree with Ricoeur’s assertion 
that the temporal experience in fiction is a “fictive experience”, I will attempt to outline 
how these fictive experiences themselves are ordered and constructed by a character-driv-
en, internal feeling of  discrepancy between internal subjective and external “real time”, 
the same epistemological clash that so puzzled McTaggart. Furthermore, in the case of  
Mrs. Dalloway for example, it is argued that the temporal experience portrayed within this 
work, however constructed and fictional, reflects the reality of  human, conscious tem-
poral experience. I propose that it is not merely a work of  art but also a work of  subtle, 
sensitive, quasi-scientific grasping, or, to put it another way, the documentation of  a truly 
metaphysical experience. 
But the question remains, in what sense can fiction be an apt territory to draw real-life 
conclusions, and in what sense can these characters have temporal experiences, which can 
27 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, trans. Kathleen McLaughlin and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
Chicago University Press, 1985), 100.
28 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 100.
29 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 101.
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be directly related back to the “reality” of  time and temporal reality? It is necessary to note 
that fiction is not the opposite of  reality, their relationship is complex and intertwined. It is 
argued here that these characters are psychologically accurate, hence I also believe that the 
approach taken echoes what Ruth Ronen calls an “integrationist” approach to fiction.30 It 
is noteworthy that two out of  the three authors of  the texts under consideration had eerily 
similar personal psychological experiences to their characters’. Being partly a fiction writer 
myself, I believe that Mrs. Dalloway and The Fall of  the House of  Usher are works of  personal 
exorcism, that the temporal experiences Woolf  and Poe described through their characters 
reflected their own personal temporal experiences - or at least, were inspired and influenced 
by them. In the case of  Bernard Malamud, the portrayal of  Isaac, however poetic and fic-
tional, can be viewed as a presentation of  a very particular case of  severe autism. Hence 
the characterization, again, fictional in terms of  concrete characters, reaches beyond fiction 
in terms of  psychological reference – it is these psychological accuracies, and the temporal 
experience outlived through them that are the focus here. 
IV. /1. Isaac from the postmodern (premature) Matrix 
American author Bernard Malamud’s short story, “Idiots First”, first published in 1963, 
recounts the tale of  a dying father in New York called Mendel struggling to get his men-
tally challenged son Isaac onto a train to his uncle. Mendel is short of  time, as he got a 
notion (from a mysterious entity called “Ginzburg”) that he will die within a day. “The 
time of  the things narrated”31 is roughly one day (Unlike Virginia Woolf, who fills almost 
two hundred pages describing just one day, Malamud’s story is rather short, twelve pages 
in the edition I read). The fictive temporal experience of  Mendel is vastly different from 
the fictive temporal experience of  Isaac and for now, I will solely focus on Isaac’s, with 
reference to McTaggart’s observations rooted in real temporal experience. 
What is striking whilst reading the story is the conflict between Mendel’s extreme 
sense of  pressure due to the passing of  time, and Isaac’s total ignorance of  it. Through-
out the entire story, the dying Mendel races against time to settle affairs around Isaac and 
get him to safety before dying. Yet Isaac has absolutely no idea what is at stake. He has 
no grasp on the temporal, or what the temporal pressure might entail. It is possible to 
state, that Isaac has no reflective, perceptive relation to the temporal universe. Neither the 
30 “Integrationalist approaches repress the ontological differentiation between worlds and posit an un-
problematic accessibility between world-systems.” Ruth Ronen, Possible worlds in literary theory, (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11.
31 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 100.
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physical elements of  it (clocks), nor the constraints imposed by these elements (passing 
of  hours), nor the threat proposed by a finite, temporal existence. It is fair to claim that 
within the scope of  McTaggart’s arguments, Isaac does not exist in a temporal universe, 
as he has no grasp or understanding of  the notions that are used to describe existence in 
time: the A Series which would require him to have a sense of  past, present and future, and 
the B Series, which would require him to have a temporal understanding of  a fixed order 
of  events. But then, in what universe does he exist? Is there a logical/traceable parallel re-
ality, which governs his every step or should we assume he lives in an inner state of  chaos? 
With reference to McTaggart, we can prove the first assumption to be true. For there is 
a concept to which he has a traceable relation. The C Series, which is the assumption that 
all units of  existence have a fixed, atemporal orderly position of  M, N, O, P. McTaggart 
illustrates this series with numbers, claiming that 17, 18, 19, 20 have a fixed ultimate posi-
tion of  following or preceding each other. What is striking about Isaac is that he seldom 
speaks or reacts to his fathers’ words with gestures or sentences that would assume his 
understanding of  them. Most of  what he says consists of  numbers. Isaac counts: “‘Isaac’ 
he ultimately sighed. In the kitchen, Isaac, his astonished mouth open, held six peanuts 
in his palm. He placed each on the table. ‘One…two…nine’”32 His irrational counting 
is a beautiful parallel to the causal reality of  the passing time, which pressures his dying 
father into action… the ticking of  a clock that we can hear in our heads whilst reading the 
story… One, two, three. 
Let us presume McTaggart’s arguments to be true and accept the fact that the tem-
poral universe is a perceptive illusion, whereas a universe based on the C Series might be 
closer to reality. What we witness here is an entity who lives precisely within this assumed 
universe. Isaac, whom we have already shown doesn’t live in the temporal universe ap-
pears to have his existence ruled and rationalized by the universe of  C Series, a numeric 
universe. In the terminology of  the Matrix he is a premature Neo. He sees beyond the 
rules of  the exterior universe and follows another. 
He counts in the wrong order which can be explained in one of  two ways: one is 
that he is an “Idiot Neo”, i.e. even though he is experiencing and perceiving the universe 
as numeric and not temporal, he still functions as an “idiot” within it, because he is un-
able to maintain the order of  units fixed. However, there is another explanation: He is not 
counting. He is communicating. If  we assume that Isaac’s reality is based on a numeric 
universe, it is fair to assume that his whole system of  communication manifests in the use 
of  numbers. Since the exterior universe presumes reality to be based on temporal and spa-
tial notions, and humans have evolved to have certain physical and mental abilities when it 
32 Bernard Malamud, Idiots First, (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1963).
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comes to expressing themselves, expressing yourself  in a temporal universe whilst you live 
in a numeric one is not simple. There has to be a communicative discrepancy between a 
person communicating with a conscious temporal mind (especially if  the temporal forces 
him to experience intense pressure) and a person with a conscious numeric mind. 
There is the potential to uncover some real sense in what Isaac says – furthermore, 
maybe in his own special way, he very consciously resonates with his father’s quest and 
indeed, tries to react to him. But he does so with a special pattern of  numbers - how 
else would he communicate from a numeric universe; therefore, his attempts remain un-
resolvable and undecodable. However, not all is in vain, if  there is one thing clear from 
this story, it is that regardless of  their troubles communicating, there is a luminous thread 
of  unconditional love between these two people, which is felt throughout the story. The 
kind of  love McTaggart described as his most cherished experience, as the fundamental 
organizing element of  the universe: “I had a curious sense of  being literally in love with 
the world. There is no other way in which I can express what I then felt. I felt as if  I could 
hardly contain myself  for the love which was bursting within me. It seemed as if  the world 
itself  was nothing but love. (…) At the back and foundation of  things I was certain was 
love – and not merely placid benevolence but active, fervent, devoted love and nothing 
less.”33 This is the love, which saves Isaac: the love, which is eternal within him, because he 
is living outside of  that temporal universe which can put an end to everything, including 
Mendel’s life. Ginzburg might have taken Mendel, but in the end, I would like to believe 
that he still somehow escaped the grasp of  mortality by loving his son unconditionally.
IV. /2. The mental time travels of  Septimus Warren Smith
Septimus Warren Smith, a character in British author Virginia Woolf ’s novel, Mrs. Dalloway 
first published in 1925, is a World War I veteran, coping with what in our present under-
standing is a clear case of  post-traumatic stress syndrome. However, a careful reading of  
his issues might suggest (with a modern reader’s mind) that there are symptoms in his 
condition which could be diagnosed as either a surfacing case of  dissociative disorder/
schizophrenia, or as Seyedeh Sara Ahou Ghalandari and Leila Baradaran Jamili claim in 
their essay “Mental Illness and Manic-Depressive Illness in Virginia Woolf ’s Mrs. Dallo-
way”34, an apparent case of  bipolar disorder and manic depression. Ahou Ghalandari and 
33 G. Lowes Dickinson quotes from J.M.E. McTaggart, Nature of Existence, in: J. McT. E. McTaggart, 168.
34 Seyedeh Sara Ahou Ghalandari and Leila Baradaran Jamili, “Mental Illness and Manic-Depressive 
Illness in Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway,” Journal of Novel Applied Sciences 3, no. 5 (2014): 482-489. 
http://jnasci.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/482-489.pdf 
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Baradaran Jamili assert that in “Mrs. Dalloway”, Virginia Woolf  separates her own mental 
condition in what they call a “bipolar experience”. She does so by dividing herself  into two 
parts, one which struggles with the reality of  her illness, a “psychotic” person (Septimus) 
and the other a “euthymic”35 person, Clarissa Dalloway – a hypersensitive creature able to 
maintain a healthy and ongoing relationship with the reality around her whilst struggling 
with the intensity of  an experience that is a deeper, more sensitive understanding of  it. 
As argued above the “fictional experience” detailed in this novel strikes me as an 
accurate portrayal of  the entity of  time as experienced by conscious human beings, and I 
find Septimus’ “fictive temporal experience” more intriguing from the point-of-view con-
cerned with the psychological accuracy of  the character, than the metaphorical relation it 
has to what Ricoeur calls “monumental time” (historical time which entails chronological 
time - the symbol of  authority figures in the novel). As Ricoeur remarks, “the art of  fic-
tion here consists in weaving together the world of  action and that of  introspection, of  
mixing together the sense of  everydayness and that of  the inner self.”36 Or as one could 
say, life. The temporal life of  conscious, human beings. And Septimus is a real, breathing 
figure within it. Virginia Woolf ’s time is anything but strictly linear, anything but absolute. 
It is full of  hoops, loops, ellipses and “internal time travel”. All the while with so much 
sensitive truthfulness, capturing the true nature of  each moment, that present, which is 
in contradiction to McTaggart’s A Series, to McTaggart’s “time”. Woolf  and Septimus 
demonstrate how the clash, felt and implied by McTaggart on what sane minds tell us 
everyday time is, as opposed to the internal realization of  its discrepancies, leads us to the 
inevitable result incorporated in living within the canon of  the idea of  everyday time – 
death, an end. For where there is time, there has to be death.37
If  Isaac is completely outside of  the temporal universe, what we witness in the case 
of  Septimus is a dire battle between trying to grasp it and completely shifting out of  it. 
Whereas in the case of  Clarissa Dalloway, due to her hypersensitive quality, she becomes 
a breathing portal that is able to fluctuate between layers of  a multidimensional reality in 
which the temporal becomes a reinvented concept, Septimus experiences a rift, a quite 
lethal rift between the objective exterior temporal reality and his interior experience. The 
unreality of  time (McTaggart’s “time”, which is also Ricoeur’s “‘monumental time’, of  
35 Ahou Ghalandari and Baradaran Jamili, “Mental Illness and Manic-Depressive Illness,” 486. Origi-
nally quoted from: Thomas C. Caramagno, The Flight of the Mind: Virginia Woolf’s Art and Manic-Depres-
sive Illness. (University of California Press, 1992): 33.
36 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 104.
37 Or as Ricoeur puts it: “the experience of the mortal discordance between personal time and monu-
mental time, of which Septimus is both the hero and the victim.” Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 
108. 
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which chronological time is but the audible expression”38) transforms Clarissa – and kills 
Septimus. 
Septimus undoubtedly experiences being removed from reality in many ways, not 
just temporal. He himself  claims that he is struggling with a certain sense of  apathy, 
his wife, Rezia desperately reminisces about how far Septimus has shifted from her and 
himself, how he mostly resembles a vegetable when he is mumbling to himself  without 
any connection or intention to communicate or react to the world or her. This perceived 
apathy, a sense of  unresponsiveness, abstaining from the ability of  ordinary human com-
munication recalls Isaac. It can be assumed that there is a pattern here: non-neuro-typical 
characters, who are struggling with external temporal notions and internal parallel uni-
verses, have a troubling epistemological alienation from their surroundings. 
What Septimus also experiences is constant alienation from ordinary sensory expe-
riences: he can no longer taste food, he can no longer hear (he can hear birds singing in 
Greek), or see as others do (he hallucinates his dead comrade to be with him), clearly, in 
all aspects, he is shifting out of  the sensory prime universe of  humans. Since the concept 
of  time is one of  these sensory deceptions, at least according to McTaggart, it is no won-
der he dissociates from it as well. But how heart-wrenching, and at the same time, how 
understandable is Rezia’s (not negatively, but objectively) selfish fear of  this sensory alien-
ation, this apathetic state in which she lost her loving husband and the happy marriage she 
hoped to have on leaving Italy and moving to England. How desperate is the struggle to 
witness a mind falling apart, and not being able to connect with it. 
It is pertinent here to analyze the most prominent visual hallucination of  Septimus 
in detail: the ubiquitous presence of  Evans. The visualization of  Evans is a clear case 
of  his subconscious mind succumbing to an internalised, self-poisoning pathological 
sense of  guilt as well as the inability to cope with the trauma of  witnessing the sense-
less death of  his friend. However, in theory we could argue that ghosts are timeless 
creatures, apparitions from a non-linear, non-temporal universe. In this way, the hallu-
cination of  the ghost also serves our purposes in illustrating how rifts between exterior 
temporal and interior atemporal universes collide in Septimus’s mind. Our reality, Mrs. 
Dalloway’s reality is temporal, and Septimus is desperately shifting away from it, to a 
territory unknown. 
Septimus also illustrates a shift from exterior temporality by displaying an ever-grow-
ing inability to internalise the perceptive presumptions of  the A Series and B Series, namely 
a clear sense of  past, present and future, and the temporal order of  events. Note this 
passage where Septimus hallucinates dogs becoming men, the logic of  which we will not 
38 Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. 2, 106. 
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examine further, because the gist of  his musing is not what turns into what, but that this is 
an ability to see into the future: 
No crime; love, he repeated, fumbling for his card and pencil, when a Skye terrier snuffed his 
trousers and he started in an agony of  fear. It was turning into a man! He could not watch it 
happen! It was horrible, terrible to see a dog become a man! At once the dog trotted away. 
Heaven was divinely merciful, infinitely benignant. It spared him, pardoned his weakness. 
But what was the scientific explanation (for one must be scientific above all things)? Why 
could he see through bodies, see into the future, when dogs will become men?39
Note how desperately Septimus tries to determine the scientific reason behind his hal-
lucination and ability. How conscious he is of  the fact that the rules of  the new universe 
in which he lives need to be explained and rationalised, or how real these parallel experi-
ences and how they re-arrange elements of  reality are to him– so real that he searches for 
a scientific explanation for it.
Once again, Septimus has not abstained from the concept of  time like Mendel’s son, 
he is conscious of  exterior time – when Rezia tries to bring him out of  a hallucination 
in which he is talking to himself  (he believes he is talking to his dead comrade, Evans), 
she asks him if  he knows what time it is (Woolf  84-85). And he does answer, it’s quarter 
to twelve. Once again, here’s a complex moment when the interior atemporal reality and 
the experience of  it (Septimus talking with Evans) clash with a voice from the exterior 
temporal (Rezia asking what time it is). Septimus can switch between the two, he listens 
to the strike of  the clock, can instantly tell what the exterior time is. But inside his head, 
the past, the present and the future are muddled. He lives with a ghost, and thinks he can 
foresee the future - the psychological arrow of  time is reversed. 
Septimus, internally, has clearly lost track of  the order in which events supposedly 
take place in the exterior reality. And via this ever-growing rift between exterior temporal 
notions and his interior universe, he makes a most baffling assertion, not long before 
he ends his life: that there is no such thing as death. Rezia, his wife, is irritated by this 
irrational announcement, but the truth is, for a mind which is (partially) atemporal, or at 
least, has the ability to experience an atemporal dimension parallel with a temporal one, 
it is indeed a logical conclusion, since temporality is linked to beginnings and ends, birth, 
life, and death. For a mind which does not exist within this framework, or is able to see 
past it, the notion that death does not exist is indeed a fairly logical one. Could it be true? 
Does the idea that reality is not temporal in nature entail the fact that neither is existence? 
Or are we living according to the rules of  linear time to force the structure of  our linear 
39 Woolf, Mrs. Dalloway, 82-83.
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physiological decay onto the universe around us? Are we part of  infinity, intertwined and 
connected, or just momentary morsels stuck between the wheels? Septimus clearly had 
intriguing ideas about it. But of  course, since he could only articulate these ideas in a tem-
poral dimension, once again like in case of  Isaac, the message is lost in interdimensional 
translation. But it does not mean that he is senseless or irrational – his thoughts have a 
logic within their own system of  existence. 
Septimus’s brain is a fascinating road map. Everything is confused, from temporality 
to spatial constructions and generic mechanics of  reality. It’s one of  the most profound 
yet relatable journeys into the mind of  a madman. 
IV. /3. The metaphysical downfall of  Roderick Usher
One of  the last thoughts of  Septimus, as we have already seen, was that there is no such 
thing as death. Indeed it may appear an irrational idea, but not in a non-temporal universe. 
The question of  what does the “end” become without time, or what happens when time 
ends is something which is of  great significance for one of  the most famous characters 
created by Edgar Allan Poe, Roderick Usher of  “The Fall of  the House of  Usher”, our 
next “Atemporal Madman”. The temporal structure of  Poe’s short story is complex and 
intricate: the fictional experience of  the temporal is driven by and constructed around 
one, unified arrow of  the temporal angst. This arrow is so strong it feels that this story is 
not unlike a fictional black hole: the density of  the inner gravitational force of  temporal 
angst twists and turns the plot elements and character experiences towards one, homo-
genic experience of  total collapse and fatal cessation (at least from the “outside”). 
Everything in Poe’s short story crudely points towards the inevitable fact that the 
Usher House (both as a family line and as a physical home) is nearing its end. This feeling 
is so powerful and so well-illustrated by the perceptive experience of  the narrator that it 
becomes almost tangible, the feeling of  this growing black hole towards which the char-
acters of  the story irreversibly gravitate. Not a spatial, but a temporal back hole (sic!). 
Even the spatial (the house and its’ natural surrounding) is simply there to illustrate the 
effect of  temporal horror. “The Fall of  the House of  Usher” is one of  the most primal 
yet brutally symbolic descriptions of  time nearing its’ end and the dreadful fear of  temporal 
creatures being sucked into this paradox. For how could time end? As per McTaggart 
it does not - because it does not exist. Yet what we can profoundly feel and witness in 
this short story about the very last descendant of  a family line and the act of  this family 
line becoming extinct, is the epistemological fear of  the end of  a temporal universe as a 
whole. The Universe of  the Ushers symbolically and quite physically ceases to exist by the 
end, and Poe describes in a poetic and symbolic way the last intense moments before the 
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complete metaphorical and physical (nota bene: the house collapses in the end) downfall. 
One could interpret this story as a poetic and prophetic vision of  the Big Crunch, more 
than a hundred years before Hawking formulated this idea. The end of  our existence, our 
universe – the end of  time. 
As we are nearing the total end of  time, drawing closer and closer to it, the charac-
ters in “The Fall of  the House of  Usher” irreversibly change from temporal to atemporal 
creatures. Note for example the catalepsy40 of  Madeleine and Roderick, which is a more 
extreme version of  the condition Isaac and Septimus suffered from: a loss of  the ability to 
communicate with, interact and react to the exterior reality of  a temporal nature. Essen-
tially, catalepsy gives the afflicted an appearance of  being dead whilst still being alive, so 
much so that cataleptic patients (including Poe) were constantly terrified of  being buried 
alive whilst in a cataleptic trance. I have always found this condition extremely intriguing, 
especially from vantage point of  an essay concerned about characters unable to exist 
within the framework of  a reality which is judged to be temporal in nature. People who 
fall into catalepsy essentially surrender all sense of  motion and change, both so-called 
pre-requisites of  a temporal experience as per McTaggart. Yet they do exist. They are not 
dead. It is as if  they involuntarily “tuned out” of  a temporal experience, dictated by the 
direction of  time’s psychological and thermodynamical arrows: the direction in which 
entropy grows: they sink into a state which creates the least possible chaos. Steady, mo-
tionless, stale, at peace. Yet it seriously distorts our natural perception of  “being alive”, 
so much so that cataleptic patients were frequently buried alive in the early 19th century.
Roderick also experiences the extreme opposite of  Septimus’s sensory apathy, he 
develops a form of  sensory overload, he is troubled by even the faintest of  light, the 
most innocuous of  smells, the blandest of  taste. His appearance also changes drastically: 
“Surely, man had never before so terribly altered, in so brief  period, as had Roderick 
Usher!” (Poe, “The Fall of  the House of  Usher”, 645). What the narrator describes here 
is essentially Roderick Usher growing very old (at least by appearance) in a very short period 
of  time, which is fundamentally a paradox, a fault in the temporal matrix, and a complete 
overturning of  the rules of  the temporal experience. In essence, he is half  a ghost - with 
a severe anxiety disorder. 
Here an interesting question arises; because if  we examine this story from the point 
of  view of  the narrator, we can truthfully claim that he is in contact with ghostly figures 
who are somehow trespassing into the temporal universe in front of  his very eyes, and the 
40 Catalepsy is a curious condition that even Poe himself experienced throughout his life. According to 
Merriam-Webster it is “a trancelike state marked by loss of voluntary motion in which the limbs re-
main in whatever position they are placed.”  https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/catalepsy 
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fact that he is in touch with them and able to see and hear and experience them means he 
himself  is shifting away from the experience of  the temporal universe. Such a meta-claim 
is appropriate here, acknowledging that this story could be read as a symbolic description 
of  the fear of  the end of  existence (of  a temporal universe), therefore, characters and 
objects at all levels of  the story will resonate with and experience the effect of  this fear 
and this fateful possibility of  an event.
Madeline, Roderick’s sister is in an even further advanced state of  transition, and 
witnessing this process terrifies Roderick yet more. At the moment that Madeline appears 
to die, all notions of  the exterior temporal causality cease to exist, as the universe is sucked 
into the temporal black hole at such a pace that it is not possible to distinguish between 
the living and the dead any longer, that Madeline might or might not be alive in the grave, 
that she might or might not already be a ghost when she comes back for Roderick. In fact, 
she is in a state of  limbo between the temporal and atemporal, and her final transforma-
tion scares Roderick to death. 
What kills Septimus is the curiosity that killed the cat, almost like an overpowering 
urge to fully succumb to the atemporal universe in his head, and what kills Usher is the 
thought of  having to do so. On a deeper level, Usher is all of  us, dreading as we do the 
possibility of  our linear, causal, external perception of  the world being shaken to the core 
and denied to us – Usher is the epistemological fear of  humans of  nearing the end as per 
our perceptive universe, from transforming from a temporal universe. 
Indeed, it is a short story with characters and plot, but it could also be interpreted as 
a sensitive description of  our brains, desperately attempting to process reality for what it 
might be, an atemporal universe where our perceptions are futile and invalid. But because 
we are unable to rid ourselves of  these futile perceptions and see reality for what it is, with 
such claim in the subconscious picture, our minds immediately perceive this possibility as 
a threat to our very existence. We cannot process the concept of  there being no time be-
cause we live in time. Therefore, the nonexistence of  time, the reality behind reality, even 
though it could quite possibly be a means of  expanding our consciousness, is interpreted 
in our minds as the end time which is the end of  our life due to it being a temporal experience 
for us. 
Conclusion
Handled with a proportionate contemporary gaze, “The Unreality of  Time” remains an 
intriguing text to apply to literary analysis. My goal was to employ J.M.E. McTaggart's 
particular arguments about the unreality of  time to decipher the logic behind the chaotic 
seeming (fictive) temporal experience of  literary characters with psychological problems. 
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I believe that the analysis is still to be fine-tuned, but it does manage to illustrate the thesis 
that an empathic bridge of  understanding can be built that moves us towards these char-
acters via McTaggart. A thorough analysis of  McTaggart’s essay was essential before delv-
ing deeper into the psyches of  Septimus, Isaac and Roderick, since I consider McTaggart, 
due to his own neurodiverse disposal, as the fourth “character” whom I set out to analyse, 
with whose thoughts I hoped to create a bridge of  understanding. McTaggart’s essay is 
often considered overly poetic, vague and subject to interpretation. With “decoding” his 
C Series, I believe I have managed to capture a different reading, and by viewing it through 
the lens of  Stephen Hawking (whose arguments I found the most pertinent for my thesis) 
I hope I have managed to present his work constructively. McTaggart, of  course, is not a 
fictional character, unlike Septimus, Roderick and Isaac, hence important (if  ever so brief) 
points needed to be made about the medium-based nature of  the temporal experiences 
of  the three fictional characters, and the borders and restrictions of  my analysis. However, 
since two out of  the three stories (and “The Unreality of  Time”) are products of  authors 
who themselves coped with psychological and neurological problems, my main motiva-
tion in deciphering the temporal experience of  Septimus, Roderick and Isaac was to un-
cover the true-to-life psychological value behind them, more so than their fictional nature. 
I believe that time is one of  the grand mysteries left in this world. Many schol-
ars, scientists and artists have looked upon its face over the centuries (or the illusion of  
centuries…) and attempted to stare into its soul to discover out what it truly is: is it an 
external set of  rules, an internal experience, or a bit of  both? Is it a complex factor that 
is inseparably interlinked with the fabric of  our universe, but ceases to exist without the 
framework of  this universe? Is it an omnipotent force, a God of  its own? Or is it just a 
story we tell ourselves to account for our own physical decay in a measurable, seemingly 
controlled manner? As long as there will be consciously or subconsciously driven think-
ers, its’ mysteries will continue to be investigated, whether in a poetic or a scientific way. I 
believe in Hawking’s staunch faith that fiction authors and scientists should work hand in 
hand, together with the ordinary people, and each can (or should) learn from the other. I 
hope that my thesis has demonstrated that even non-neurotypical, quasi-fictional minds 
can hold more vital, intriguing and relatable information about the nature of  time than 
what the surface of  their seemingly irrational (fictional) experiences suggest. 
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